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INTRODUCTION
SO EXTENSIVE and diversified have become the activities of federal
agencies and services that the employees of the executive branch alone
now number some eight hundred thousand.1 Though they range all the
way from riveters to entomologists, from clerks to engineers, all are
identified in the popular mind by one common characteristic: they work
"for the government." This special status encumbers any analysis of
the rights, privileges and duties of government employees with many
considerations supposedly inapplicable to a discussion of labor problems
in private industry. The political theorist, for example, is troubled by
the whole gamut of metaphysical notions conjured up by the concept that
the employer is "the State." The assertion of any rights by government
employees against the employer-state is branded as a derogation of sover-
eignty. A "strike" becomes tantamount to treason itself. Some go so
far as to analogize all government workers to the military forces, despite
the obvious distinction on the basis of the urgency of the services rendered.
The chief fallacy in this entire approach lies in its failure to differentiate
the government as sovereign from the government as an employer of
civilian workers. 2 In its latter capacity the government merely hires
people to perform essential work.3 Particularly from the standpoint of
the employee-whether it be stenographer, printer, messenger or drafts-
man-the job is a job and the government little more than an ordinary
employer.4
The government employee is also often distinguished from his indus-
trial counterpart on the tenuous ground that he is employed by an organ-
ization which is not run for profit. While this may be literally true,
especially if "profit" is understood in a very narrow sense, the differen-
tiation is both useless and unrealistic. As a practical matter, employees
work not for the Government as an abstraction but for and under the
control of certain individuals, section chiefs or division heads as the case
tMember of the Washington, D. C. Bar.
1. See U. S. Civil Service Commission, F-m-THnm ANNuAL Rrxo= (1936)
34 et seq.
2. For a discussion of the patriotic issue and soldier analogy see Srno, Tnn L.roa
MovmnNT rN A Gov mrNr INDusmv (1927) 17-20.
3. The work of the largest departments is often of a "non-governmental" character,
in the past conducted by private agencies. Id. at 12.
4. See Dykstra, In Defense of Government (1937) 189 Ai-ni.xs 5.
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may be. Strongly actuated by a desire for advancement or for the added
personal prestige which results from outstanding division 'records, super-
vising government officials behave in much the same fashion as many
less enlightened private employers. The history of the Post Office Depart-
ment, greatest of government industries, is replete with illustrations.5
Nor are others hard to unearth. "The flimsy charge of inefficiency has
shielded not a few dismissals of government employees because of union
activity.8 Similarly, that perennial source of complaint for some indus-
trial workers, the speed-up, has often plagued government employees,
especially in such large semi-mechanical units as the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, the Treasury and the Social Security Board.' Dissatisfaction
and unrest among employees were particularly rife in the latter depart-
ment, where new supervisors were striving to enhance their own reputa-
tion by exacting the maximum work from their units.0 All too often
the ambitious official, challenged by employees to readjust unfortunate
conditions, takes refuge in the concept of "executive responsibility" and
its supposed corollary that his authority brooks no interference. His
reaction is not unlike that of the business man who "will not be told by
any damned union how to run his business" and proceeds from the same
unconscious emotional bias. Indeed the government official is more
fortunate in that "executive responsibility" sounds so much more im-
portant and mysterious.
Another obstacle to a dispassionate analysis of the problems confront-
ing government employees is the popular conception of the character
of those who occupy positions in the government service. The general
public is inclined to view the civil servant as a surly, uncooperative in-
dividual, who has procured a soft job through political pull and who
has never done an honest day's work in his life. He is regarded as a
person with no real ambition or ability, for otherwise he would be "out
in the world". doing something worth while and getting somewhere
instead of putting his nose into other people's business. This popular
attitude may be explained in part by the long association of government
service with the spoils system. In the earliest days of the Republic,0
precedents were created for a practice which still rankles the reformer.10
5. Spao, op. cit. supra note 2 at 139, 141, 144.
6. See e.g., Am. Fed. of Gov. Employees ex rel. Donovan, I NLRB 24 (1934).
7. See Testimony, pp. 89 et s q. Sumpf & Shultz v. Social Security Board (1937).
8. See Findings and Recommendations, Sumpf & Shultz v. Social Security Board,
William Savin, Arbitrator, Oct. 20, 1937.
9. See Friedrich, The Rise and Decline of the Spoils Tradition (1937) 189 ANAtJs
10-41.
10. President Jackson justified the spoils system in the name of efficiency; long
tenure, he believed, resulted in "a habit of looking with indifference upon the public
interests." President Jackson's First Annual Message to the Congress, quoted in
WHITE, Puirc ADmxNISTRATI6N (1926) 223, 224. For a modern statement of a similar
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Though some progress has been made in the development of a "merit
system," it was not begun until another means of support for political
parties had been found" in the growing industry and business of the
post-Civil War period.' 2 And while today some sixty percent of the
federal employees are sheltered under the civil service, a government job
is still considered, in the public mind, to be a political plum."
II.
The supposed differences between government and private employees,
whatever their validity, should not obscure the similarity of the prob-
lems confronting both groups. But while resolution of these problems
through unionization has come to be recognized as commonplace in
private industry, organization of federal employees has been hampered
by the popular conception of the uniqueness of the government service.
Whether working conditions in the government are so singular that
unions are unnecessary can best be discovered by examining in their
historical setting specific federal problems of wages, tenure and hours.
COMPENSATION
The average government employee receives an annual salary of $2 146 .1
The wage rates included in this estimate are usually set by reference to
legislative standards and occasionally by some form of collective bargain-
ing. The first method represents substantially an application of the
Classification Act of 1923.11 This important piece of legislation was
passed on the initiative of the National Federation of Federal Employees"'
position see Turn, In Dfense of Patrorage (1937) 189 Azmz.s 22, 25. A more popular
and respectable sentiment was voiced by Justice Peckham in condemning as semi-
barbarous the maxim "to the victor belong the spoils:' Rogers v. City of Buffalo,
123 N. Y. 173,177,25 N. E. 274, 275 (1890).
11. See FIsn, TaE CrVm SwRvic Am TnH P^AoN^zA (1905) 23M-235.
12. See Friedrich, supra note 9, at 15. Another cause for the gradual elimination
of the spoils system is the greater need in modem government for employees of technical
training. See Sharp, Public Employment (1934) 12 Eucvc. Soc. Scammccs 628, 632.
13. Considerations of political affiliation may determine the filling of some three
hundred thousand other jobs. U. S. Civil Service Comm., Firrv-rUnM AzwuAL REMonT
(1936) 4. In addition to the exceptions made in the Civil Service Law itself [See
* Civil Service Act and Rules, Statutes, Executive Orders, and Regulations (1934) 60
et. seq.], a number of recent statutes, such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933,
have allowed some appointment without reference to Civil Service rules. 48 SrT. 37
(1933), 7 U.S.C. §611 (1934).
14. Sharp, supra note 12, at 628. The average appears to be a little too high.
15. 46 STAT. 1003 (1930), 5 U.S. C. § 673 (1934). Postal employees have been
subject to various special classification acts, r.g., 34 SArT. 1206 (1907), 39 U. S. C. § 103
(1934) ; 42 STAT. 1491 (1923), 5 U. S. C. § 1062 (1925), 39 U. S. C. § 610 (1934).
16. See MAYERs, TnE FEDEA SErvzcz (1922) 553.
1111
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
and others, for the purpose of achieving uniformity of pay schedules for
similar work, thereby relieving the discontent and uneasiness caused by
the wide variations. The Act classifies offices according to their respective
duties, with fixed salary schedules arranged by grades.1  To facilitate a
workable system, however, the Act permits the grades and subsidiary
classes to be changed whenever necessary.
The Government Printing Office and the Tennessee Valley Authority
present the outstanding illustrations of wage fixing by collective bargain-
ing. In the Printing Office a minimum of ninety cents an hour is set
for time actually worked, but above that the Public Printer has authority
to set wage scales in the public interest.1 ' In practice, the wages, includ-
ing night and overtime compensation, are determined by "a conference
between the Public Printer and a committee selected by the trade affected,
and the rates and compensation so agreed upon shall become effective
upon approval by the Joint Committee on Printing." In the event of
disagreement, appeal may be taken to the Joint Committee (a committee
of Congress) for final decision. The wages thus fixed may not be changed
for a year.
The Tennessee Valley Authority follows a somewhat similar practice.
Although the statute merely requires payment of the prevailing wage,"9
the scale adopted for manual workers has many of the earmarks of a
collective bargain.
"19. In accordance with Section 3 of the Act creating the Authority
not less than the rate of wages for work of a similar nature prevail-
ing in the vicinity shall be paid to laborers and mechanics. In the
event any question arises as to what are the prevailing rates of wages,
which question cannot be settled by conference between the duly
authorized representatives of the employees and the Authority, it
shall be referred to the Secretary of Labor for determination, and
the decision of the Secretary shall be final. In the determination of
such prevailing rate or rates, due regard shall be given to those rates
which have been secured through collective agreements by repre-
sentatives of employers and employees." 20
17. The compensation schedules fixed by Congress [42 STAr. 1491 (1923), 5 U. S. C.
§ 673 (1934), as amended by 45 STAT. 776 (1928); 46 STAT. 1003 (1930); 49 STAT.
724 (1935), 5 U. S. C. § 633 (Supp. III 1937)] apply only to civilian employees of the
departments in the District of Columbia and not to employees in the field service nor
to workers whose work comes within the classification of any recognized craft or skill.
46 STAT. 1005 (1930), 5 U.S.C. § 663 (1934). The heads of the various executive
departments are authorized to adjust the salaries of field employees to correspond as
far as possible with those in the departmental service. 48 STAT. 308 (1933), 5 U. S. C.
§678 (1934).
18. 42 STAT. 1489 (1923), 5 U.S.C. § 664 (1934).
19. The statute only makes wage provision for mechanics and laborers. 48 STAT.
59 (1933), 16 U.S.C. §831(b) (1934).
20. EMpLoYE.E RELATioNsHIP POLICY, TExNESSEE VAILE AUTHORr= (1935) 10.
A different plan, which does not come within the bounds of the collective bargaining
(Vol. 47: 11091112
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Here, too, it is provided that schedules once fixed shall not be open
to revision more than once a year.2 ' By 1937, two wage conferences
had been held, at which agreements were reached on the basis of material
on the prevailing wage presented by both the management and the ten
unions interested.
22
Another example of wages not fixed by or with reference to the Class-
ification Act is the compensation paid to employees of the navy yards.
Their wages are fixed by the commandants of the yards, and are supposed
to "conform as nearly as is consistent with the public interest, with those
of private establishments in the immediate vicinity."23
Adjustment of compensation by collective bargaining raises the im-
portant problem of the relationship of government wage scales to those
of corresponding private industries. Although the test of conformity
with outside wages is sometimes an explicit, and probably always an
unexpressed consideration in fixing wage schedules, on the whole Ameri-
can unions of government employees have been sparing in their criticism
of this standard. On the other hand, English Civil Service organizations
have bitterly opposed the test on the theory that the comparison is ir-
relevant--that men and women in the service have no alternative but
to remain in their positions, for in most cases their skill has no market
value.' A broader argument against fixing government salaries in ac-
cordance with the prevailing rate may be based on the "model-employer"
theory of public personnel relations. According to this view, the govern-
ment should have the affirmative obligation of setting the pace toward
adequate wage standards, rather than merely keeping abreast of existing
levels.2" The National Labor Relations Board intimated a similar view-
point when it said in its opinion in the Donovan case, in reference to
another phase of labor relations, ". . . When the NRA is engaged
method cf wage-fixing, has been adopted for clerical and other non-manual employees.
Id. at 11.
21. ]bid.
22. Clapp, Principles of the T.V.A. "Relationip Policy and Their Application,
Address before Annual Meeting of the Civil Service Assembly of the United States and
Canada, Oct. 6, 1937. A similar plan of conferences with union representatives has been
followed for the non-manual workers. Ibid.
23. 12 STAT. 587 (1862), 34 U. S. C. § 505 (1934). Compare the Executive Order
of Dec. 7, 1913, which provided that all artisan and supervisory artisan positions under
the Navy Department were to be included in the competitive classified service. However,
no schedule of wages has been provided for this group; wages seem to be fixed per
statute. The clerical forces of the navy yards are paid at the rate determined by the
Secretary of the Navy. 35 STAT. 754 (1909). The same is true for employees engaged
in drafting, technical, and inspection work. 39 STAT. 558 (1916), 39 U.S. C. § 504 (1934).
24. See WHrE, VHi7LEY CouNciLs nr 'Hmn BRrrsu Crvr. SnuvtcE (1933) 158.
25. See MosnEa & KINGSLEY, Pu.tic PEnsoNEL ADmimNsITATioN (1936) 472;
SPERO, The State as Sovereign and Employer in PRoBLE s OF A.txc=A Punuc SEwc,
THE CoMMIssIoN OF INQUIRY ON PUBUC SERVcE PERsONNEL. (1935) 197.
1113
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
in compelling employers to observe strictly the provisions of Section 7 (a),
it should, in dealing with its own employees, carry out the purposes of
that section with even more scrupulous care than might be expected of
ordinary employers." 26 Government agencies, however, show no eager-
ness to assume such a responsibility. Probably the more common attitude
goes no further than desiring the Government not to prescribe terms of
employment which compare unfavorably with those obtaining .outside
the Civil Service among good employers.2 Some 23 have even gone to
the extreme of arguing that compensation of government employees
should compare unfavorably with salaries available in private industry
since government employees have advantages in the form of retirement
provisions and sick leave.m But this claim hardly merits consideration,
for many large companies have pension schemes and almost all private
employees now have the benefits of Social Security.
TENURE
The supposed security of tenure of government employees, especially
in the classified civil service, also is often regarded as a justification for
a lower wage scale. Yet experience has demonstrated that, at least so
far as his legal rights are concerned, the government employee has little
cause for a feeling of security, even in the classified civil service-the
only group of employees having any protection in this respect. An illus-
tration is afforded by the probationary system.
A person who has been selected from the list of civil service eligibles
receives at first only a six months probationary appointment. If after
trial during this period, the "conduct or capacity of the probationer be
not satisfactory to the appointing officer, the probationer shall be so
notified in writing, with a full statement of reasons, and this notice shall
terminate his service.''30 The probationer has no opportunity for either
a reply or a hearing. There are no bounds to the appointing officer's
power to discharge. He may dismiss an appointee whose conduct is dis-
pleasing for any reason whatsoever. In justification of this sweeping
power the Civil Service Commission has only been able to say that the
six months probationary period is in effect a part of the examination
and therefore the probationer is not entitled to the protection afforded
to permanent appointees.81
26. Am. Fed. of Gov. Employees ex rel Donovan v. Johnson, 1 NLRB 24, 28
(1934).
27. See WHnx, WHITLEY CouxcILs IN THE BRIsH CIVIL SEIVCE (1933) 159,
28. Id. at 158-159.
29. See statutory provisions for retirement. 46 STAT. 468 (1930), 5 U. S. C. 0 691
(1934) ; Employees Compensation Act, 39 STAT. 742 (1916) ; 5 U. S. C. § 751 (1934).
30. CIVIL SERVICE Acr AND RULES, STATUTES, EXECUTIVE ORDERS, AND REGULATIONS
(1938) 32 (Rule VIIc).
31. Id. at 57, n. 4.
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Security for employees in permanent status is contained in the Lloyd-
La Follette Act of 1912.32 While today this Act seems to afford only paltry
protection in comparison with the safeguards granted to private em-
ployees by the National Labor Relations Act, in its day it was deemed
the Magna Charta of government employees. Its great importance and
uniqueness make it worth quoting almost in full.
"No person in the classified civil service of the United States shall
be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the effi-
ciency of said service and for reasons given in writing, and the
person whose removal is sought shall have notice of the same and
of any charges preferred against him, and be furnished with a copy
thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable time for personally answer-
ing the same in writing; and affidavits in support thereof; but no
examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required
except in the discretion of the officer making the removal; . . .
Membership in any society, . . . or other form of organization of
postal employees not affiliated with any outside organization imposing
an obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike, or propos-
ing to assist them in any strike, against the United States, having
for its objects among other things, improvements in the conditions
of labor of its members, including hours of labor and compensation
therefor and leave of absence, by any person . . . in said Postal
service, or the presenting of any grievance . . . to the Congress or
any member thereof shall not constitute or be the cause for reduc-
tion in rank or compensation or removal of such person or groups of
persons from said service. The right of persons employed in the
Civil Service . . . either individually or collectively, to petition
Congress, or any member thereof, or to furnish information to
either House of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof
shall not be denied or interfered with."
As some of the wording indicates, this statute resulted from an in-
cessant struggle between the administration and the postal employees,
in which the latter had been hampered by the so-called gag rules. The
first part of the Act is substantially a codification of the Executive Order
of July 27, 1897, made pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Service
Law, which prohibited removals from positions subject to competitive
examinations except upon written charges plus notice and opportunity
to answer.
Employees and Congress alike, however, came to regard this Executive
Order as insufficient. Perhaps one of the chief reasons for this dissatis-
faction was the emasculating effect of certain court decisions. A number
of suits had been brought by employees to enjoin their superiors from
dismissing them without following the Order's requirements of notice
32. 37 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C §652 (1934).
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and opportunity to answer. With but two exceptions, 3 the courts ruled
that they lacked equity jurisdiction.' The Regulation was treated simply
as an instruction to subordinates within the general executive power
of the President, carrying with it no judicial remedy for a violation.s'
The court was of the opinion that its equitable jurisdiction was limited
to the protection of property interests; that it had no concern with the
removal of public officers unless they had a vested right in the office
and were being illegally removed; and that the Regulation was insuffi-
cient to vest any property right in the office. One court went so far as
to say that while the President has the power to make regulations con-
cerning removals, the regulations could not be regarded as laws because
they were completely subject to modification or revocation at his whim."
While it might have been hoped that codification of the regulation in
the Lloyd-La Follette Act would give employees such property rights as
would be protected by courts of equity, apparently no suits have been
brought under it in that form. Only mandamus, of all the other ways
suggested by the Supreme Court for the trial of the right to office,
has been used very frequently and since it is available only to force
officials to do purely ministerial acts, 7 it has not proved very successful."
But a number of suits have been .brought prior to and subsequent to
the passage of the Lloyd-La Follette Act to recover salary lost because
of unjust dismissal. Salary can be recovered for the period of an illegal
suspension, even though the suspension may culminate in ultimate dis-
missal. 9 But should the employee be illegally dismissed, there is
grave doubt whether he can recover anything at all. Some courts ration-
alize that removal in disregard of the procedure required by the Lloyd-
La Follette Act does not make the dismissal illegal and void. The in-
cumbent is disabled from claiming he has not been removed; his only
33. Priddie v. Thompson, 82 Fed. 186 (C. C D. V. Va. 1897); Butler v. White,
83 Fed. 578 (C. C. D. W. Va. 1897).
34. Flemming v. Stahl, 83 Fed. 940 (C. C. W. D. Ark 1897); Morgan v. Nunn,
84 Fed. 551 (C. C. M.D. Tenn. 1898); see HIGH, INJuNcrixos (2d ed. 1880) 1 1315.
35. Carr v. Gordon, 82 Fed. 373 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1897).
36. Page v. Moffett, 85 Fed. 38, 40 (C. C. D. N.J. 1898); see Covper v. Smyth,
84 Fed. 757 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1897) ; Taylor v. Taft, 203 U. ,S. 461 (1906). The courts
-appear to have the feeling that it would be an undue interference with administration
to substitute their discretion for that of an executive officer by taking jurisdiction and
enjoining an illegal dismissal. Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290 (1900); cf. 26
Ors. An'ry GEN. 363 (1907).
37. United States v. Postmaster of City of Buffalo, 221 Fed. 687 (W. D. N.Y.
1915).
38. Taylor v. Taft, 203 U. S. 461 (1906); see (1936) 5 GEO. WAsn. L. Ray. 145.
39. United States v. Wickersham, 201 U. S. 390 (1906); Corcoran v. United States,
38 Ct. CL 341 (1903); Steele v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 403 (1905); Beulring v.
United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 404 (1910).
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remedy is to proceed without delay to try his right to the office. 4° Fur-
thermore, the illegal removal does not create an obligation upon the
Government to pay a salary to a person so removed after his removal
and for an indefinite time thereafter. It becomes the duty of the person
dismissed to appeal, with reasonable diligence, to the officer having author-
ity to revoke that illegal order." While this may appear to be reasonable,
it gives the employee very little satisfaction if the officer refuses to with-
draw the unreasonable order. Some of the cases place considerable
emphasis upon the requirement that the claimant shall act with reasonable
diligence and are quick to eradicate all claims by holding the claimant
guilty of laches.2 If the claimant acquiesces in receiving oral charges
by answering them orally, he may be held to have waived his rights
under the Act.43 If these hazards are overcome and if the removing
officer refuses to recall the order, the claimant's recovery is still problem-
atical. In none of the dismissal cases is it stated how much salary the
claimant should receive."
Another problem arises where an employee claims his dismissal is
unmerited, despite compliance by the superior official with the procedural
steps required by the Lloyd-La Follette Act. In France, government
employees may sue in the administrative courts for damages caused by
unfai" acts of superior officials.45 But apparently no suit for damages
has ever been brought in the United States, and there is little reason for
believing that such an action would fare any better than the suit for
an injunction or salary. The courts have refused to interfere with the
actions of administrative officers in this respect, despite the rather clear
words of the statute.46 So long as the procedure required by the Lloyd-
La Follette Act is followed, the courts have expressed themselves as
unwilling to go into the merits of the decision.47 In a recent case, for
example, an employee had been accused of rather serious misconduct
and the removing officer, without any hearing, simply found the answer
40. O'Neil v. United States, 56 Ct. Cf. 89 (1921); Richardson v. United States, 64
Ct CL 233 (1927).
41. Nicholas v. United States, 55 Ct. Cl. 188, 191 (1920), aff'd, 257 U. S. 71 (1921)
(Wickersham case distinguished on ground that suspended employee immediately pro-
tested against the illegal order).
42. Norris v. United States, 257 U. S. 77 (1921); Richardson v. United States,
64 Ct. Cl. 233 (1927).
43. Morse v. United States, 59 Ct. CI. 139 (1924), appeal dismissed, 270 U. S. 15
(1926).
44. Since many employees have indefinite appointments, the measure of recovery
in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926)--salary for the term of appointment-
is inapplicable.
45. WHITE, THE CzVI, ISERVICE IN THE MODERN STATE (1930) 259-261.
46. Cf. United States v. Postmaster of City of Buffalo, 221 Fed. 637 (NV. D. N. Y.
1916).
47. Eberlein v. United States, 53 Ct. CL 466 (1918).
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to the charges "unsatisfactory." Contending that the accusations were
perjured, the employee sued for his salary, but the court said, "It is
not within the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into the guilt or inno-
cence of the plaintiff as to the charges upon which he was removed
. . . it appearing from the averments . . . that every step requisite
to the removal from office was taken by the Bureau officials . . . that
their action in removing him . . . is conclusive and is not subject to
review by the court."4' 8 This attitude 9 is in marked contrast to the
position of the courts on the question of the review of administrative
decisions in other fields.50
Clearly, the courts have failed to enforce the law and have refused to
give employees the protection under it which Congress apparently in-
tended. But much of the blame may be attributed to the weakness of
the Lloyd-La Follette Act itself. The rights granted by the Act are
vague; the remedies non-existent. Although the Act forbids dismissals
except for "such cause as will promote the efficiency" of the service,
the statement is so broad and indefinite that it may easily be twisted to
serve unwarranted ends. There is, of course, a tendency to bring un-
popular persons within the terms of the Act by calling them incompe-
tent.5 Before an impartial tribunal, no charge is more difficult to
combat. Before an official who has already made up his mind, the task
is insuperable.
Furthermore, by its terms the Act applies only to the classified civil
service, and omits emergency employees, laborers or persons holding
exempted offices. 52 Another great weakness is the failure to require a
hearing, even before the dismissing officer. Since the civil servant is
still practically at the mercy of his supervising officer, a hearing before
some impartial, disinterested person or body would be infinitely prefer-
able. If the dismissing official himself were required to give the dis-
charged employee a hearing, the employee would be protected only in
the case of a conscientious supervisor who was not affected by the depart-
mental policies and intersectional feuds and pride which abound in
48. Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 682, 685 (1934); cf. Kellom v. United
States, 55 Ct. Cl. 174 (1920); 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 79, 83 (1913). ("It is for the head
of a Department and not the Civil Service Commission to determine when there exists
proper cause for the removal of a classified civil service employee in his Department.").
49. But cf. MAss. Gm. LAws (1932) c. 31, § 43 (giving employees, primarily
policy officers, the right to appeal to the courts in the event of dismissal); Wnrtn,
PuBrac ADmImNsm&vxON (1926) 333 (system of reviewing dismissals in Chicago).
50. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) (trial de novo) ; St. Joseph Stoclyards
v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936), (independent weighing of facts in rate case upon
claim of a constitutional issue).
51. The cause given may simply be "for the good of the service." Burnap v. United
States, 252 U. S. 512 (1920).
52. 30 OPs. "Ai-r'v GEN. 181 (1913).
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government departments of any size. But rare indeed are such officials,
and the dismissing official who meets the requirements of disinterested-
ness is usually far too busy with more important matters to listen to
a thorough hearing and to witnesses. A hearing before another official
of the same Department is unsatisfactory because witnesses are afraid
of the penalties which might result if they testify in a manner obnoxious
to their supervisors.0 Even the Civil Service Commission, which is
not generally known as a friend of the government worker,5 has recog-
nized the need for some sort of impartial board of review." But in
spite of this pressing need for an independent review agency, and in
spite of considerable employee pressure on its behalf, scant progress in
that direction has been made.
In addition to these loopholes, the Act provides no protection against
either waves of governmental economy or against the abolition of offices.
The feeling of the courts seems to be that the purpose of the Act is
to protect only those accused of malfeasance, not those who are merely
no longer needed in a given department.50 And the Civil Service Com-
mission has so ruled.51 In making reductions in the force of employees,
the head of the department or agency may apparently not only disregard
the Lloyd-La Follette Act but may also override with impunity statutes
and executive orders which expressly relate to orders of reduction. The
case of United States ex rel. Rhodes v. Helvering is an example. There
the petitioner, an accountant in the Bureau of Internal Revenue, was
dismissed because inadequate appropriations necessitated a reduction in
the force. The petitioner contended that she had been dismissed in vio-
lation of two Executive Orders 0 and a statutecO Order number 4240
53. See Record, pp. 168, 362, 380, 1890, 1930, Sumpf & Shultz v. Social Security
Board.
54. See 1 S=uDms ox Amiwrxsra vE Mm mnAmwrT (1937) 5.
55. U. S. Civil Service. Commission, Furzrm ANIUAL Rmor (1933) 11; cf.
Durand v. Federal Power Commission (unpublished) where the NLRB, as arbitrators,
strongly recommended an impartial body to hear cases of union discrimination.
56. Longfellow v. Gudger, 16 F. (2d) 653 (App. D. C. 1926) held that it is not
necessary to prefer charges and follow the procedure prescribed by the Act in order to
determine that an employee is surplus. In Stilling v. United States, 41 Ct. CL 61 (19OM),
which arose under the Civil Service Regulations requiring notice and opportunity to
reply, it was held that an employee whose services were no longer required might be
dismissed even if another were appointed to his place within a very short time. This
provides an easy way of getting rid of an employee politically or personally distasteful
to the supervising official. Accord: Brown v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 255 (1904).
57. CxVuL SERVICE Acr AND Rums (1936) 53; see Comment (1934) 2 GEO. WNAsf.
L REv. 463, 464. It is a question of fact whether the office has been abolished in good
faith. The presumption is in favor of a proper exercise of authority. People ex rt.
Nuttall v. Simis, 18 App. Div. 199, 45 N. Y. Supp. 940 (1897).
58. 84 F. (2d) 270 (App. D. C. 1936).
59. Executive Orders 4240 of June 4, 1925, and 6175 of June 16, 1933.
60. 42 STAT. 1491 (1925), 5 U. S. C. § 673 (1934).
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provides that reductions shall begin with the lowest efficiency ratings,
with additional credits for length of service." The statute provided that
the departments might furlough employees in rotation in order to spread
the work. Petitioner's efficiency rating was above that of a number of
others who were not dismissed. However, the court, with practically
no discussion of petitioner's contentions, held that there was no evidence
that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had abused his discretion
or had violated any duty in passing upon the facts involved. Judge
Stephens dissented, holding that the clause in the economy act requiring
the dismissal of married persons first was not inconsistent with the
statute requiring that employees with the lowest efficiency ratings should
go first. In this case there were a number of married employees with
lower efficiency ratings than the petitioner who were not dismissed.02
The statutes and executive orders regulating dismissals had as their
purpose the elimination of the personal element and substitution of the
merit system, with some exceptions such as the married persons clause.
But the court by refusing to recognize the statutes and orders, allowed
administrators to exercise their personal, unguided and unlimited discre-
tion. Perhaps the court was influenced by some thought that adminis-
trators should be able to exercise wide discretion over their assistants
in order to effectuate desired policies. However, the people sought to
be sheltered from unrestrained personal discretion are similar to the
employee involved in the Rhodes case: technicians, clerks, stenographers
and the like. It is immaterial to the administrator if such positions are
occupied by A or by B. While no cases have arisen in which injunctive
relief was sought there is little doubt that the courts would not enjoin
a dismissal illegal under the priority regulations any more than a dis-
missal contrary to the regulation requiring notice of charges and an
opportunity to reply.63
HOURS
A wide area of administrative discretion characterizes the determina-
tion of the work-day of most government employees. As a result, the
number of hours varies considerably. For example, the basic law apply-
ing to hours of work in the executive departments provides for a minimumflr
seven-hour day, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, and for a further
61. Order No. 6175 made immaterial changes in the additional points for length
of service.
62. For a criticism of the majority opinion see (1936) 5 G-o. WAsH. L. Rm, 145,
146.
63. Cf. Longfellow v. Gudger, 16 F. (2d) 653 (App. D. C. 1926) (the requirement
that employees with military preferences should be the last dismLsed was completely
disregarded).
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extension upon a statement of reasons.6 ' This prescribed amount of time
has been interpreted to be exclusive of the luncheon period; the law,
it is said, requires seven full hours of labor for the Government."5 How-
ever, the absence of any reference to a Saturday half holiday"" was
bridged by a rather ingenious ruling of the Attorney General. 7 Since
Saturday is a half holiday in the District of Columbia according to the
Code of the District, the employees within the District were not required
to work after noon. And the present statute extends the half-holiday to
almost all government employees.68 The reasons which must be given
for extending the working hours beyond seven are entirely within the
discretion of the head of the Department, since the law sets up no
standards.69
To a limited extent, some degree of uniformity has been achieved as
a result of recent Congressional legislation. In 1936, Congress passed
a law requiring the heads of departments and independent agencies to
meet for the purpose of issuing regulations as nearly uniform as possible
governing the hours of work in their respective agencies. 70 Pursuant to
this legislative direction, a meeting attended by representatives of almost
all of the government agencies was held on March 26, 1936.71 A Com-
64. And no additional compensation is allowable in case of an extension. 30 STAT.
316 (1898), 5 U.S. C. § 29 (1934). If public business is in arrears, the head of the
department s$a/ extend hours of service. 30 STAT. 316 (1898), 5 U.S.C. §31 (1934).
This statute applies only to employees of the executive departments in Washington.
22 Ops. ATe'y GEN. 62 (1898).
65. 22 Ops. ATr'y G r. 62 (1898).
66. The present statute reads: ". . . four hours, exclusive of time for luncheon
shall constitute a day's work on Saturdays . . . for all civil employes of the Federal
Government . . . exclusive of employees of the Postal Service . . . employees of
the Interior Department in the field, whether on hourly, per diem . . . or other basis:
Provided that . . . where for special public reasons, . . . determined by the head of
the department, the services, of . . . employees cannot be spared, such employees
shall be entitled to an equal shortening of the workday on some other day . . ."
46 STAT. 1482 (1931) 5 U.S.C. §26(a) (1934). Note that the statute relates only
to time worked Saturday afternoons.
67. 25 Ors. ATr'i Gr'r. 40 (1903).
68. See note 66 supr ,. The employees of veterans' agencies (hospitals, etc.) are
exempt at the discretion of the administrators and no time off is given for working
full hours. 47 STAT. 1482 (1931), 5 U.S. C. § 26(b) (1934). For other exemptions,
see 50 STAT. 269 (1937), 5 U.S.C. § 26c (Supp. III 1937); 50 STAT. 706 (1937),
12 U.S. C. § 640 r(c) (Supp. III 1937).
69. 20 Ors. ATT'Y GEaN. 728 (1894) (referring to the statutory provision vhich
gives the heads of departments authority to make rules for the government of their
respective departments). 17 STAT. 283 (1872), 5 U.S.C. §22 (1934).
70. 49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U. S. C. §29(a) (Supp. III 1937). The Post Office
and the corporations under the supervision of the Farm Credit Administration are
exempted from the provisions of this Act. 49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U. S. C § 30(b)
(Supp. III 1937); 50 STAT. 706 (1937), 12 U. S. C. § 640r(c) (Supp. III 1937).
71. Report of Civil Service Commission to Congress, January 31, 1937 (unpublished).
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mittee on Hours of Duty and Overtime made a study of existing con-
ditions and recommended a uniform schedule based on a threefold
classification of workers.7 2 Fifty-two agencies reported that they had
schedules substantially similar to the recommendations: of these some
of the larger employers are the Post Office, Federal Emergency Admin-
istration of Public Works, General Accounting Office, Resettlement Ad-
ministration, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Works Progress Admin-
istration. Other agencies departed from the schedules recommended by
the Committee, including the Departments of State, Treasury, War,
Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Labor, the Government Printing Office and
the Veterans Administration. Most of the deviations were on the side
of longer hours, but they may probably be excused by the words "as
nearly as may be practical" which appear in the legislation providing
for uniform hours among the departments.7"
The achievement of an eight-hour law was an objective of some of
the earliest union activity in the government service. The letter carriero,
whose tours every day lasted from nine to eleven hours, enlisted the
aid of the Knights of Labor in their fight.74 Despite the opposition of
the Department, which tried to discourage the movement by suspension
and removal of participating employees to inconveniently located routes, 75
the first eight-hour law applying to Post Office employees was secured
in 1888.78 For three months, however, no attempt was made by the
officials to enforce it and for five years after its passage "enforcement
was but half-hearted and every effort was made to evade it."77 The
Department contended that the eight-hour day meant a fifty-six hour
week and that "if a man worked nine hours a day for six days, he still
72. The schedule may be summarized as follows:
Group I. Office workers, professional, scientific and sub-professional employees; office
messengers and laborers, investigational and inspectional employees: Seven hours
per day, 39 hours per week is recommended.
Group II. Professional, scientific and technical employees engaged primarily in outdoor
work; custodial employees, messeiigers with special assignments, laborers in shops
or in outdoor work; mechanical and crafts employees; employees protecting life.
and property: Eight hours per day, 40 or 44 per week is recommended.
Group III. Custodial and guard employees in penal institutions; seamen, farm and
railway laborers, professional employees and custodial workers in hospitals: An
average of 8 hours per day, or 44 hours per week, with the enforcement of this
average distributed over a three-month period.
73. 49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U. S. C. §29(a) (Supp. III 1937).
74. SPrao, THE L wa MOVEMIENT IN A GOVERNMENT INDusRY (1927) 64. In
1889 the Letter Carriers' National Association was organized by the Knights of Labor.
MOSHER & KINGSLEY, PuBLic PznSoN x ADMINISTRATION (1936) 495.
75. SPRo, oP. cit. supra note 74, at 65.
76. 25 STAT. 157 (1888). Provision was made for extra pay for overtime, but the
act applied only to letter carriers.
77. SPao, op. cit. supra note 74, at 72.
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owed the government two hours at the end of the week.y"' 8 The Depart-
ment's contention was repudiated by the Court.71
But the postal clerks were not so successful as the letter carriers. In
spite of great dissatisfaction and considerable agitation, the passage of
an eight-hour law for them was delayed until 1912-0 by their own
internal division into several organizations, the extremely adverse atti-
tude of the Department and the "gag rules" which prevented the clerks
from petitioning Congress."' Moreover, the law was not strictly an
eight-hour law since it provided for an eight-hour working day which
was not to extend over ten consecutive hours.8 2
Today, the eight-hour day law applies to all mechanics and laborers
employed by the government or through contractors on public works or
in connection with harbor work, except in cases of "extraordinary
emergency." '  The Attorney General has interpreted the Act to cover
all laborers and mechanics in the government service, without limitation
to public works." But a number of other questions have arisen under
the Act. The determination of those included in the classification of
laborers or mechanics is largely a matter of interpretation of specific
fact situations. There is some disposition to limit overtime to those
situations which the ordinary person would denote as being in fact an
"extraordinary emergency."' "
Overtime, however, is still a source of grievance for government em-
ployees, and at almost any-union meeting some discussion of the problem
may be heard. Usually, the chief complaint is directed against the gov-
ernment's failure to give extra pay for overtime or to provide for com-
pensatory time-off. The factual basis for this complaint is apparent from
a reading of the relevant acts and their interpretation.
78. Id. at 73.
79. Post v. United States, 148 U. S. 124 (1893). As a result of this decision, the
Department paid claims for overtime amounting to approximately $3,500,000. SPMo,
op. cit. mnpra note 74, at 73.
80. 37 STAT. 554 (1912), amended 43 STAT. 1059 (1925), 39'U. S. C. § 118 (1934).
81. Spnno, op. cit. .jupra note 74, at 93-94, 111-179.
82. The present law provides for an average of eight hours per day for 306 days
per annum and for overtime pay above eight hours. 43 STAT. 1063 (1925). 39 U.S. C.
§ 613 (1934).
83. It is unlawful for a government officer to keep laborers vworking longer than
eight hours. 27 STAT. 340 (1892), 40 U.S. C § 321 (1934). The provisions of the
eight hour law have been applied to the employees of the Printing Office. [28 STAT. 607
(1895) 44 U.S.C. §42 (1934)]; Post Office (43 STAT. 1063 (1925), 39 U.S.C. §613
(1934)]; and Customs Inspectors, 41 STAT. 402 (1920), 19 U.S.C. § 267 (1934).
84. 20 Ops. An'ry GEN. 459, (1892) ; 29 Ops. ATe', GE%. 505 (1912).
85. See Circular Letter from Attorney General to U. S. Attorneys, Oct. 31, 1906,
quoted in Civ. SEvicE AcrAND RurEs (1934) 193. n. 6.
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Only one statute authorizes the granting of overtime leave to employees
in general and that applies only to hours worked on Saturday afternoon! 0
If the employee has worked two Saturday afternoons without getting
his time off, he may not combine them and take one whole day off, for
the Comptroller General has ruled that the "statute may be properly
applied only by granting compensatory time -off from duty in units of
less than one regular working day.""1 Fortunately, the lack of legislative
authorization has not prevented some of the more progressive agencies
from taking the matter into their own hands and granting "overtime
leave" for overtime worked on Sundays and other days as well as on
Saturday afternoons. Thus the Tennessee Valley Authority has made
an arrangement in regard to overtime worked by the annually rated
employees (generally the office workers) s which is considerably better
for the employees than that provided by the-statute governing Saturday
afternoon work. All authorized overtime is recorded and is accumulated
as earned annual leave!s9 This gives the employee considerable flexibility
with respect to when he will take the earned leave and allows him to add
it to his summer vacation if he wishes to take a long trip. However,
this action is completely unauthorized and almost always taken informally
without any written'administrative orders or instructions. In comparison
to the subject of overtime leave, overtime pay is well covered by statutory
provision. The most general statute provides that: "No money shall be
paid to any clerk employed in any department at an annual salary, as
compensation for extra services, unless expressly authorized by law." D
Since by far the most general rule is that there is no compensation for
overtime, most agencies cannot pay for overtime even if they so desire."'
Complaints against this policy had apparently reached the ears of
Congress by 1936, probably through some of the local unions of the
American Federation of Government Employees. A law was therefore
passed requiring a record of overtime to be kept from July 1, 1936
until the end of the year, and providing for a report to be made by the
86, 49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U.S.C. §26(a) (Supp.'III 1937). In the Post Office
Department, overtime leave is allowed by statute at the option of the employee. See
note 82, supra.
87. 11 Comp. Dec. 159, 161 (1931).
88. The hourly rated employees receive time and a half payment for overtime.
EMPLOEE Ru.ATIoNSHip POLICY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 7. This may be done without
legislative sanction since the authority is an independent corporation not subject to many
laws governing other governmental agencies.
89. Id. at 8.
90. 14 STAT. 569 (1867), 5 U. S. C. § 51 (1934).
91. Some offices are specifically granted overtime compensation such as the Post
Office, [43 STAT. 1063 (1925), 39 U. S. C. § 613 (1934); 42 STAT. 725 (1928), 39
U. S. C. § 828 (1934) (extra pay for night work)] and the Customs Bureau, 36 S,,T.
901 (1911), 19 U.S.C. §267 (1934).
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Civil Service Commission. 2 This report, based on the records kept at
the dates specified,9 3 has already been made, but the record has never been
printed or made public by the Civil Service Committee of the House
with which it was filed. 4 Yet the records show a serious situation.
During the six months covered, overtime for 76,448 employees totaled
10,613,698 hours or an average of 1,768,949 hours per month. All of
the overtime hours included in this figure, moreover, represented un-
compensated overtime and fifty percent of the overtime was accounted
for by employees who received less than two thousand dollars a year.
$7,762,393.70 is a rather large gift or tax for government employees
to- make or give to the Government in six months. If the schedule of
hours which was recommended by the Committee on Hours of Duty
and Overtime had been adopted, the picture would make the Government
look like even less of a model employer."5 Yet this report, showing an
unfair and unfortunate situation, has remained with Congress for over
a year without any remedial action. 3
In contrast with this policy concerning overtime, however, the Gov-
ernment's treatment of many of its employees in regard to vacation
compares favorably with the best industrial practice. For example, since
1936, all civilian employees, with some exceptions, regardless of their
tenure, are entitled to twenty-six days annual leave with pay each year,
exclusive of Sundays and holidays.Y Temporary employees, except those
engaged in construction'work at hourly rates, receive two and a half
days of leave for each month of service. 3 Employees of government
corporations, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, are also given
the leave privileges provided for in the statute.03
92. 49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U.S.C §31(a) (Supp. III 1937).
93. I am fortunate in having obtained a typewritten summary of the report and
part of the original in full.
94. Inquiry at several agencies has disclosed that the records were inadequately
kept. The overtime was considerably more than the record shows, for in no case was
overtime of less than thirty minutes reported..
95. The hours of overtime would have amounted to 13,775,154, with a cost to the
Government, if the employees were paid for the overtime, of $10,69,127.90.
96. "The description of e:isting Federal personnel legislation as a 'patchwork with
many large holes' is perhaps well taken:' 1 STUDIES On AomisrI2ATiYE MANAGEMI NT
(1937) 1.
97. 49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U.S.C §30(b) (Supp. III 1937).
98. The Act applies to the departmental employees of the Post Office Department
and to those employed in the Mail Equipment Shops. 49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U. S. C
§ 30(1) (Supp. III 1937). Other employees of the Postal Service are entitled to fifteen
days a year leave of absence. 45 STAT. 595 (1928) 39 U. S. C § 823 (1934).
99. 49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U.S. C. § 30(d) (Supp. III 1937). Laborers paid by
the hour are apparently not granted annual leave by the T.V.A., perhaps because of the
specific exception applying to temporary employees engaged on consruction vork,
49 STAT. 1161 (1936), 5 U.S.C §30(b) (Supp. III 1937), and the application of
§30(b) to government corporations by 49 STAT. 1162 (1936), 5 U.S.C §30(d) (Supp.
III 1937).
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MORALE
The high morale so necessary in public administration suffers in no
small degree from a number of defects in the present system. Two of
the most important are the absence of a regularized plan of promotion 00
and the inadequate machinery for redress of grievances. The lack of
a good plan of promotions has been the subject of complaint by both
employees and persons interested in public administration. The laws
governing the promotion of civil servants generally are restrictive or
permissive; none give employees any right to promotion. Ordinarily,
promotions cannot be made unless the employee has passed an examina-
tion demonstrating his fitness for the new office.101 However, for many
promotions, such as from the lower to the higher clerical grades, no
examination is required since the examination passed by the employee
upon entering the service is sufficient to demonstrate his fitness.102 Pro-
vision is also made for rating the efficiency of employees, and for a
minimum which must be met before an employee is eligible for promo-
tion.10 ' But even when the efficiency requirement is met, the promotion
is still dependent upon administrative decision. During economy driven
any possibility of promotion vanishes. For example, the Economy Act
prohibited any administrative promotions (from grade to grade) during
the fiscal year ending in June, 1934.10 4 Only in the post office department
are automatic promotions- made. After a year's satisfactory service,
clerks in first and second class post offices and city letter carriers are
entitled to yearly promotions from grade to grade until they reach the
fifth grade.10 5 But in no event may a promotion be made unless the
employee has served efficiently and faithfully during the year.1(3 Similar
provision for automatic promotion up to a certain point is made in the
motor vehicle service.'07 None of the other departments, however, pro-
vide for automatic promotions, and not even all post office employees
receive the benefit of such a system. Unless there is a well-recognized
administrative policy to make regular promotions for efficient service,
no particular incentive motivates federal workers to do more than is
actually required. Certainly there is very little feeling among the majority
of government employees that hard work will earn them a rise in the
organization. The effect of such an attitude upon morale is marked.
100. See WHrrE, PuBLic ADmINISTRATION (1926) 243.
101. 22 STAT. 406 (1883), 5 U. S. C. § 638 (1934).
102. CIVxIL SERVicE ACT AND RuLEs (1928) 42, n. 35; CxvIL SEnVICz Act AND Rur.,s
(1938) 54, n. 39.
103. 37 STAT. 413 (1912), 5 U. S. C. § 648 (1934). By statute, transfers may include
promotions. 42 STAT. 1491 (1923), 5 U. S. C. § 670 (1934).
104. 47 STAT. 1513 (1933).
105. 43 STAT. 1059 (1925), 39 U. S.C. § 108 (1934).
106. 34 STAT. 1206 (1907), 39 U.S.C. §109 (1934).
107. 43 STAT. 1059 (1925), 39 U. S. C. § 117 (1934).
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A further cause of irritation and discontent is the unheeded accumu-
lation of grievances. The feeling that one employee has been unjustly
treated may undermine the morale of a whole class of employees."' 8 Al-
though this fact is widely recognized, no legislative action has been taken
to remedy the situation, except for the limited appeals which may be
taken to the Civil Service Commission by aggrieved employees. Many
types of grievances arise. They deal with everything from insufficient
lighting to overtime, improper job classifications, unfair efficiency ratings,
and unjust dismissals. Very few departments have made an attempt to
set up any sort of machinery to deal with these matters, many of which
could be speedily and satisfactorily adjusted within the departments.
Other complaints, by their nature, require the intervention of a disin-
terested agency if they cannot be settled satisfactorily within the depart-
ment. Even those agencies which have attempted somewhat to deal with
the problem have not set up anything remotely resembling adequate
machinery. The Social Security Board, after considerable unrest in its
Baltimore office, set-up a joint board, composed of representatives of
the administration and union members to deal with complaints on effi-
ciency ratings. This, however, has proved in practice quite inadequate
to deal with the many types of grievances which may arise. It is fairly
typical of what action has been taken. In its 1934 annual report, the
Civil Service Commission urged the establishment within the depart-
ments of "conciliation committees" with appeal to the Commission, to
take care of grievances. One experimental committee was set up but
nothing further has been done."* That the application of ideas of con-
ciliation and arbitration are not impossible in "a public service, dominated
for generations by authoritarian traditions and individualistic ideas" is
shown by the existence and accomplishments of the Whitley Councils
in England.'" As a result of the work of the various unions through the
machinery provided by the councils, the conditions of service of some
300,000 British Civil servants are governed by agreements."' The Ten-
nessee Valley Authority has made a similar effort in its Employee Rela-
tionship Policy. This provides:
"22. . . at least thirty (30) days published notice shall be given
of any proposed new rule or change in established rules. No new
rule may be adopted or existing rule changed until the duly author-
ized representatives of employees have had reasonable opportunity
to confer with the supervisory staff and the Personnel Division."
While the employee representatives have no actual power, they are at
least given an opportunity to be heard and their objections may carry
10& WHim, Pumic ADmxmsTRo7oN (1926) 238.
109. Crvm. SEavimE Coi& ssrow, Frry-Fmsr A.uAL Rmow (1934) 9.
110. See ,VHrr, WHIT-Er Cou.Ncms 1 Tn BRamsn CvIL Smvrcz (1933) X.
111. Id. at 343.
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some weight if a genuine effort is made by the Administration to arrive
at a fair understanding."' 2
UNIONIZATION
Many of the unsatisfactory phases of government employment outlined
above may be attributed to insufficient pressure by the employees them-
selves." 3 In contrast to the sweeping rights guaranteed all workers by
the Wagner Act, the Lloyd-La Follette Act of 1912, the only law dealing
with the rights of federal employees to organize, merely provides that
membership in a union slall not be a cause for demotion, suspension or
dismissal. 14 The Act refers specifically to postal employees although it
is generally assumed that all employees are protected by the policy there
declared. In any event, no head of an agency today is apt publicly to
contend the contrary. President Roosevelt, in a letter dated August 16,
1937, to Mr. Luther C. Stewart, President of the National Federation
of Federal Employees, stated his views in part as follows:
"Organizations of Government employees have a logical place in
Government affairs. The desire of Government employees for fair
and adequate pay, reasonable hours of work, safe and suitable work-
ing conditions, development of opportunities for advancement, facil-
ities for fair and impartial consideration and review of grievances,
and other objectives of a proper employee relations policy, is basi-
cally no different from that of employees in private industry. Organ-
ization on their part to present their views on such matters is both
natural and logical . "
Even in comparatively recent times, however, administrative officers
have thought it undesirable to have government employees organized
and did not hesitate to say so publicly. Postmaster General Burleson, in
his annual report to Congress for 1917, said that the formation of organ-
izations with the purpose of "interfering with the discipline and admin-
istration of the service, the control of the election of persons nominated
for public office, or enactment of legislation for their selfish interests
and not for the welfare of the public should cease." He also contended
that the organization of government workers was unnecessary since "they
112. Other attempts at employee representation have been made-in the Printing
Office and in the Post Office, during the early twenties under Postmaster-General Will
Hays. MOSHER & KINGSLuy, op. cit. supra note 74, at 488-491.
113. Until the summer of 1937, there were only two unions of any size which covered
government employees generally. The larger one, the American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees (an A. F. of L. affiliate) was opposed to public expression of grievances
or agitation by local unions because its President believed such demonstration would
interfere with his lobbying activities. Nine locals were expelled in 1937 because of
their refusal to abide by this policy.
114. 37 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. §652 (1934).
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can always depend upon public opinion to insure their enjoyment of their
full rights under employment."115 It has already been pointed out how
little sympathy the generally misinformed public has for federal em-
ployees. Mr. Burleson does not say how the public is to be informed
if there are no employee organizations to give publicity to existing abuses.
In spite of such officials, the naked right to join labor organizations
appears to be fairly well established. But recognition of this right raises
the question of the privilege of government employee organizations to
affiliate with associations of non-government workers. Isolated govern-
ment unions are at a great disadvantage in obtaining the passage of
favorable legislation: they are thwarted by the popular mistrust and
antipathy toward the job-holder on which legislatures capitalize; they
are subject to political restrictions which prevent them from taking an
active part in politics and elections; they have many members who can-
not even vote. Because of these disabilities, affiliation with the national
labor movement, which does wield political power, is a matter of vital
importance.
The Lloyd-La Follette Act appears to guarantee the right of affiliation
if the outside organization imposes no duty to strike. At one time and
another, vigorous objection to affiliation with the American Federation
of Labor, based on a fear that its interests might conflict with those of
the Government, has divided the allegiance of federal employees. In
1920 a suggested amendment t6 the Retirement Act, introduced by Sena-
tor Myers, aimed to exclude from the benefits of the Act those persons
who belonged to an organization of government employees which was
affiliated with a superior body of organized labor.110 The Senator thought
that the American Federation of Labor had placed itself in a position
of opposition to-the Government by the steel strike of 19 19.1T He also
believed that employees should not be led to criticize the Government m8
and since labor organization was based upon conflict of interest it had
no place in the Government where no such conflict existed. 112 Fortu-
nately, the amendment failed to pass. However, a similar proposal may
soon arise again in view of the growth in membership of government
employees in the Union affiliated with the Committee for Industrial
Organization.' °
"115. Annual Report of the Postmaster-General, 1917, quoted in WVHnE, Pun uc
AvmsTRATioN (1926) 385.
116. 59 ConG. RPc. 5131 (1920).
117. 59 CoNG. Rc. 5133 (1920). The Senator'also thought it very bad that govern-
ment employees should be affiliated with organizations asking for the release of Mooney,
Debs and Emma Goldman. Id. at 5139.
118. ibid.
119. Id. at 5141.
120. Government unions were forbidden to affiliate with the British free labor move-
ment as a result of the hysteria caused by the general strike in 1926, even though the
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To many people, the affiliation of any government union with a national
labor organization instinctively connotes a strike of federal employees.
Perhaps one of the important specific causes of this association is the
Boston police strike of 1919.121 Then almost any discussion of govern-
ment unionism is likely to degenerate into a parade of the horribles
resulting from a strike of government employees. A great point is made
of the fact that they are public employees, and patriotic and other irrele-
vant issues are injected into the discussion. Broad generalizations are
made without any apparent attempt to analyze the situation in realistic
terms. Even President Roosevelt who has shown himself generally sym-
pathetic to government unionism is apparently somewhat influenced by
this point of view and says in his letter to Mr. Luther Stewart:
"Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant
tactics have no place in the functions of any 6rganization of Gov-
ernment employees. Upon employees in the Federal service rests
the obligation to serve the whole people, whose interests and welfare
require orderliness and continuity in the conduct of Government
activities. This obligation is paramount. Since their own services
have to do with the functioning of the Government, a strike of
public employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their
part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government until their
demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the paralysis of
Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable
and intolerable."122
Thus an industrial dispute is unconsciously converted i'nto treason by
assuming an intent to obstruct the Government without regard to the
untreasonable purpose of the intent. Another possible objection to a state-
ment of this sort is that it lumps together all government employees and
assumes that a strike by any of them would inflict great injury upon the
public. No doubt the public would be endangered or inconvenienced by
the strike of some employees; but as to others the fear is entirely un-
grounded. A strike of the research assistants in the Department of Agri-
culture, of the laborers on a T. V. A. dam, or of the workers in the
navy yards would cause the public no particular inconvenience. A strike
of the employees of the Chase National Bank would certainly result in
much greater public inconvenience than a two weeks strike by the whole
personnel of the Government printing office. However, it is not yet
treason to strike against the Chase National Bank.
Even assuming that any strike of government employees would directly
injure the public, there is really no factual basis for the fear of a strike.
Civil Service did not participate. Wm'r, Wnrn.Ev CouNcIs (1933) 297-298. If the
fear of the CIO becomes much greater in this country, a simila. prohibition is likely
to be enforced.
121. MosHR & KINGSLEY, op. cit. supra note 74, at 514.
122. Italics supplied.
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The three unions covering government employees generally, and a num-
ber of the other unions, have provisions in their charters foreswearing
their right to strike. Furthermore, government employees as a whole
are docile and opposed to the use of the strike. With the exception of
a few small strikes in the arsenals, navy yards and the printing office,
there has only been one incident resembling a strike in the Departmental
service, the so-called Fairmont Strike in the first decade of the twentieth
century." In view of the history of government unions, their present
policy and the temper of government employees, the continual discussion
of the strike problem is indeed gratuitous.
It is interesting to note that there is no statute forbidding a strike of
government employees. There are, however, statutes which may be used
to break a strike, such as that used against the postal employees. It has
been suggested that the Sherman Act could be invoked against certain
striking government employees, for conspiring to restrain interstate com-
merce.' But the equity of Civil Service employees in the retirement
fund is probably enough to deter them from striking and thereby risking
dismissal. For instance, while in England there is no law forbidding
public employees to strike, the Attorney General has intimated that "such
a strike would violate the conditions upon which His Majesty's Govern-
ment grants pensions on retirement."'
In contrast to our attitude, Mexico allows considerably more freedom
to Government employees; Last December, the Senate approved a bill
introduced by President Cardenas granting public employees the right to
organize and strike.m The scheme provides for the division of all em-
ployees into two classes, confidential employees, those holding executive
and responsible positions, and "basic employees," including all others.
The bill only applies to basic employees. Strikes by government employees
are formally recognized as a legitimate means for redressing just griev-
ances, such as non-payment of wages or failure on the part of higher
officials to observe the requirements of the law. To be legal they must
be supported by a majority of the employees of the department involved
and must be peacefully carried out.' While Mexican Government em-
123. A criminal statute forbidding interference with the mails was invoked against
the employees of the Farimont office, who resigned in protest against intolerable con-
ditions. SPTEo, PROBLE s OF AmEwcCAn PUBLIC SERVICE (1935) 184-185.
124. Cf. United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1894).
125. WHITE, VHITLEY COUNCILS IN THE BRITISH CIVIL SERVICE (1933) 293.
126. Mexican Labor News, Dec. 30, 1937.
127. It is pointed out that strikes for the adjustment of intolerable conditions will
inevitably occur, whether legal or not. By giving such movements legal status, the
government encourages definite norms regulating the relations between state employees
and their superiors. The preamble of the bill dispels the fallacy of considering a strike
of federal employees as a strike "against the state as such." Mexican Labor News,
July 7, 1937.
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ployees may strike for only certain limited causes, the recognition of the
right at all, in an affirmative manner, is revolutionary as compared with
the United States and Great Britain."m
Although it is considered a legitimate activity for an ordinary labor
union to secure favorable legislation from Congress, federal employees
are seriously handicapped by the restrictions imposed upon their political
activity.1 29 Civil Service Rule 1, § 1, provides in part that ."persons
.. in the classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they
please and to express privately their opinions on all political subjects,
shall take no active part in . . . political campaigns." In defining "po-
litical activity," the Commission has ruled that "If politics is involved,
active participation by classified employees is prohibited . . . This in-
cludes such activity in connection with a labor union interested in the
enactment of legislation regarding labor."' 0 Classified employees are
forbidden "any political activity which is prohibited by the rule in the
case of an employee acting independently" when carried on "in secret
or open cooperation with others. Whatever the employee may not . . .
do directly or personally, he may not do indirectly or through an agent,
officer, or efiployee chosen by him or subject to his control."1 "1 This in-
terpretation of the rule very definitely limits the role which a union of
government employees may play in assisting their friends at election
time. Employees may not solicit votes or even help in getting out votes
on election day.1"2 With these limitations, it is small wonder that Con-
gressmen are slow to respond to requests of federal workers. But these
rules are not always obeyed. In 1902, the postal employees, with the aid
of organized labor, succeeded in defeating Congressman Lord, who was
an enemy of the much needed reclassification in the postal service. But
this is one of the few cases in which federal employees politically punished
an opponent.13 Every year the Civil Service Commission reports upon
cases of political activity investigated and the disciplinary action recom-
mended. In 1935 there were 236 such cases reported.'" The employees
128. No law specifically prohibits government employees from striking in this country.
But from a practical point of view the strike would not be a very effective weapon in
the face of overwhelming executive, legislative and judicial opposition, as well as public
hysteria aroused by use of the words "treason" and "mutiny" in describing the conflict.
129. It is ironical that the political restrictions, now considered a handicap, were
originally conceived for the protection of public servants. The Civil Service Act thus
gave the Commission and the President power to make rules governing political activity.
22 STAT. 403 (1883), 5 U.S.C. §633 (1934).
130. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND POuTICAL ASSESSMaTS
(1936) 1.
131. Id. at 3.
132. Id. at 5.
133. SPERo, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN A GOVERNMENT INDUSTRY (1927) 99.
134. FiFry-sECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1935) 12.
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who are most likely to engage in such activity are apparently fourth class
postmasters and rural letter carriers, who are engaged in local politics.13
Under the Lloyd-La Follette Act, however, employees or their repre-
sentatives are given the right to petition Congressmen on matters affect-
ing their interests. 3 This provision was made necessary by a series of
executive orders, known as the "gag rules," which aimed to prevent any
employees going to Congressmen with their grievances." These orders
caused such agitation and unrest in the Post Office Department, at which
they were primarily aimed, that they were finally brought to the atten-
tion of Congress by Senator La Follette and resulted in the enactment of
the Lloyd-La Follette Act. 38 Now it is well settled that employees may
petition Congress but of course there is no effective way of making
Congress listen to the petition.
Administrative officials apparently have always been afraid of allowing
employees to gain any political power. In 1868 Gladstone was afraid to
allow government employees to vote for fear that they would use their
votes to secure their own class interests.1 39 It is always contended that
if public employees succeed in achieving political power, they will use
it for "selfish ends"--that is, for their own good." Yet the organiza-
tion of special interests politically to obtain ends they believe desirable
from their own point of view is so common in American politics as to
pass without comment. Apparently Congress really fears the possible po-
litical power of organized employees in conjunction with organized labor.
While a Government Union must necessarily devote a major share of
its energies to legislation, there is also room for considerable activity in
guiding, assisting and putting pressure on administrative discretion.
Throughout this article, examples have appeared which illustrate the great
breadth of administrative discretion. With regard to hours, compensa-
tion (within grades of a classification), promotions, working conditions,
tenure and all of the elements making for a high morale, administrative
action may accomplish much without additional legislation. The head of
a department may even refer disputed discharges to an outside agency
for arbitration, if he desires, without any legislation. A government
union can and should apply itself to working out schemes for the pro-
motion of the welfare of employees along this line. Compulsory arbitra-
135. FIFrTH ANNUAL REPonr (1933) 14.
136. 37 STAT. 555 (1912), 5 U. S. C. § 652 (1934).
137. See MAYERS, op. cit. supra note 16, at 548-549. The Orders were the Govern-
ments answer to the agitation for better classification and automatic promotion in the
Post Office Service. SPERO, THIE LABOR 'MOVEMENT IN A GovwR.nrn I. usra" (1927)
97.
13M Id. at 167.
139. WHITE, WHITLEY COUNCILS IN THE BRITISH CIvn. S. vicE (1933) 22M.
140. MOSHER & KINGSLEY, op. cit. spra note 74, at 512.
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tion, a higher minimum wage and payment for overtime are examples
of things which will require legislation. Yet they are fewer in number
and on the whole less important than those reforms which may be achieved
if executive cooperation could be obtained, and a collective bargaining
system established.
It is sometimes urged that the Government cannot engage in collective
bargaining with its employees. In fact, the President in his letter to Mr.
Stewart made such a statement.
"All Government employees should realize that the process of
collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted
into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable limita-
tions when applied to public personnel management. The very nature
and purposes of Government make it impossible for administrative
officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in mutual discus-
cussions with Government employee organizations. The employer is
the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their repre-
sentatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and
employees alike are governed and guided, and in many instances
restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures, or rules in
personnel matters."
Yet, it must be noted that the President says "collective bargaining, as
usually understood." A collective bargain has been defined as "a state-
ment of the conditions upon which such work as is offered and accepted
is to be done."'' Just what the President meant is hard to say, but in
terms of the definition cited, the Government can move considerably in
the direction of entering into a collective bargain, or more correctly, a
government department may engage in collective bargaining. In all of
those matters in which the Administrator has discretion, a bargain may
properly be made. It is said that the Administrative official cannot "bind
the employer." True, his agreement would not be proof against legis-
lative action, for Congress could at any time change the terms of the
agreement. However, private contracts of a similar nature are also not
completely immune from legislative action, Federal or local. The head
of each department has authority to prescribe regulations for the conduct
of his department and the conduct of the employees.' There is no reason
why such regulations cannot be made with the advice and consent of the
representatives of the employees. There is no lack of power if the ad-
ministrator wishes to exercise it.
It may be argued that such a regulation by contract will not be binding
upon a successor. But while the ordinary rule that the decision or contract
141. Hamilton, Collective Bargaining (1930) 3 ENcYC. Soc. SciENcEs 628.
14Z 1 STAT. 28 (1789) as amended, 17 STAT. 283 (1872), 5 U. S. C. § 22 (1934).
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of an administrator binds his successor1 43 is probably inapplicable to this
type of situation, that hardly seems a valid reason for refusing to make
a contract. A collective labor agreement in private industry will not
necessarily bind a purchaser or successor of the employer. And there is
considerable continuity in the conduct of government departments so
that settled practices become adopted and continue regardless of changes
at the head of the department. These official customs are sometimes
referred to-as the "common law of the department." 1" As a practical
matter, working conditions agreed to by an administrator would not be
subject to violent mutations, but would alter slowly as conditions changed,
not as administrators changed.
The union also can render to its members an important service by
seeing that existing laws and regulations are followed. Employees are
governed by laws and regulations so numerous and diverse that the most
conscientious administrator is apt to violate them frequently. By spe-
cializing in this highly technical field, the union may assist the adminis-
trator as well as its own members. It is, however, of basic importance
that the union should not restrict its scope of activity to any one of the
three major fronts of legislation, collective bargaining, and enforcement.
The union which desires to be of the greatest assistance must attempt
to balance the three types of activity equally.
143. 9 Ops. ATT'r GEN. 32 (1857); 9 Oes. Ar', GEN. 300 (1859); 13 OPs. Aar' -
GEN. 3 (1869); 13 Ops. ATrry GEN. 226 (1870); 13 Ops. A-r'r GEN. 387 (1871);
17 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 315 (1882) ; 34 Ops. A'Tey GEN. 55 (1923); 34 Ops. AT1'y GFs. 320
(1924).
144. United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. 1, 14 (U. S. 1833); see 19 Ops. An'rT GMT.
401 (1889) ; 20 Ops. A-r'y Gm¢. 730 (1894).
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